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Abstract 
Corruption is a global problem, impacting on both economic and human development. The last few decades, social science 
research has paid increasing attention to the problem, but rit emains limited in many aspects, not least because of the lack of 
reliable data. As a result, there are no reliable aproaches to eliminate corruption, and most reform attempts fail. Still, some 
countries have apparently managed to reduce corruption to manageable levels. What did they do right? This dissertation aims 
to contribute to the understanding of how a non-corrupt and effective public administration can be implemented. The three 
papers in the dissertation approach the problem from different angles, taking the Swedish case as their point of departure. 
Special emphasis is placed on the issues of remuneration and recruitment of civil servants. Previous research and theory 
suggests that a meritocratically recruited and salaried civil service is an important deterrant of corruption, and a prerequisite 
for efficiency. In contrast, civil servants are in many countries recruited on the basis of political loyalty or personal 
connections, and insufficiently paid. This was also the case in Sweden until, at least, the middle of the 19th century. The story 
in the papers is however not one of a single defining moment where corruption was rooted out and effective government 
implemented. The processes studied in the papers stretch over centuries.  
The main conclusion of the dissertation is that the relationship between public administration, corruption and good 
government in general is complicated and context-dependent. Some, seemingly corrupt, practices may be functional given the 
administrative constraints. For instance, informal payments may function as an automatic way of financing the 
administration, albeit with important drawbacks. Theoretically optimal institutions may also be impossible to implement 
given political constraints, if politically powerful groups stand to lose from their implementation. In that case, a less 
ambitious but feasible reform is preferrable. Furthermore, some institutions may serve a country well, but later become 
obsolete in the face of new challenges. It is thus important to take local context into account, both to identify the institutions 
that will work best given the circumstances, and to determine how to implement them. 
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